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Abstract  
Media headlines reporting scientific research frequently include generic phrases such as “Scientists 
believe x” or “Experts think y”. These phrases capture attention and succinctly communicate science 
to the public. However, by generically attributing beliefs to ‘Scientists’, ‘Experts’ or ‘Researchers’ the 
degree of scientific consensus must be inferred by the reader or listener (do all scientists believe x, 
most scientists, or just a few?). Our data revealed that decontextualized generic phrases such as 
“Scientists say…” imply consensus among a majority of relevant experts (53.8% in Study 1 and 60.7-
61.8% in Study 2). There was little variation in the degree of consensus implied by different generic 
phrases, but wide variation between different participants. These ratings of decontextualized phrases 
will inevitably be labile and prone to change with the addition of context, but under controlled 
conditions people interpret generic consensus statements in very different ways. We tested the novel 
hypothesis that individual differences in consensus estimates occur because generic phrases encourage 
an intuitive overgeneralization (e.g., Scientists believe = All scientists believe) that some people revise 
downwards on reflection (e.g., Scientists believe = Some scientists believe). Two pre-registered 
studies failed to support this hypothesis. There was no significant relationship between reflective 
thinking and consensus estimates (Study 1) and enforced reflection did not cause estimates to be 
revised downwards (Study 2). Those reporting scientific research should be aware that generically 
attributing beliefs to ‘Scientists’ or ‘Researchers’ is ambiguous and inappropriate when there is no 
clear consensus among relevant experts.  
Keywords: Generics; Generalization; News Headline; Inference; Cognitive Reflection Test; Scientific 
Consensus  
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Readers, listeners, and watchers of news media frequently encounter attention-grabbing headlines 
reporting scientific research. Listed below are three genuine examples taken from mainstream media 
outlets. 
1. Scientists believe the secret of a good night’s sleep is all in our genes (The Guardian, 2017) 
2. Experts think early humans ate grass (BBC, 2012) 
3. Eating more nuts could slow weight gain, researchers say (Sky News, 2019) 
These brief snippets capture attention and succinctly communicate science to the public, but their 
brevity creates ambiguity. Do all scientists believe the secret of a good night’s sleep is in our genes, 
most scientists or just some scientists? Because the noun phrase is unquantified (Scientists believe…) 
rather than universally (all scientists believe…) or exactly quantified (one scientist believes…), 
readers must form their own subjective interpretation about the degree of scientific consensus.  
Statements such as 1-3 are known as ‘generics’. They generically attribute a claim to ‘scientists’ 
rather than specifically to one scientist or one group of scientists. Generics are not just limited to 
communicating science but appear frequently in everyday discourse. Phrases such ‘Ducks lay eggs’, 
‘Tigers have stripes’ and ‘women read magazines’ are not unusual (Abelson & Kanouse, 1966; Leslie, 
2008). Generics, however, do have an unusual property: they require little evidence to be judged as 
true (Cimpian, Brandone & Gelman, 2010). While ‘All men like DIY’ might be considered false 
(perhaps because it only takes one counterexample to falsify this claim), the generic ‘Men like DIY’ is 
more likely to be accepted as true. Such generics are relatively immune to counterexamples, with 
statements such as ‘Ducks lay eggs’ or ‘Mosquitos carry the West Nile virus’ seeming to be true even 
when these claims are clearly not true for all members of the category (i.e., male ducks do not lay 
eggs and 99% of mosquitos do not carry West Nile virus) (Leslie, 2008). 
Generics are frequently used to report primary scientific research (DeJesus, Callanan, Solis & 
Gelman, 2019). Academic papers routinely make general claims about Humans, Adults, Males, 
Children, Introverts and Extroverts etc., that gloss over variation within each category (e.g., DeJesus 
et al., 2019; Simons, Shoda & Lindsay., 2017). Generic phrases are also common in secondary 
reporting of scientific research by the news media. One specific function of generics, identified above, 
is to attribute the source of scientific claims using phrases such ‘Scientists say…’ or ‘Experts 
believe…’ (Robbins, 2012). Just as generic claims about ‘Males’ gloss over variation among males 
(DeJesus et al., 2019), generic claims about ‘Scientists’ gloss over variation in scientific opinion. 
Sacrificing precision for simplicity creates ambiguity. For example, the generic phrase ‘Experts 
think…’ can truthfully refer to almost any proportion of relevant experts1. It is up to the reader or 
listener to infer the degree of consensus. One reader may take this phrase to mean ‘All’ relevant 
experts (e.g., a definitive consensus statement), another may take this to mean ‘Most’ relevant experts 
while another may perceive it as a claim relating to just one specific subset of experts (e.g., the 
specific authors of a Study). The purpose of the two studies presented below is to reveal 1) the degree 
of scientific consensus implied by commonly used generic phrases such as “Scientists say…”, 
“Experts think…” and “Researchers believe…” 2) to reveal the extent to which estimates of 
 
1 Although generic phrases such as ‘Experts think…’ can truthfully refer to almost any proportion of relevant 
experts there are likely to be some pragmatic limits to their use. For example, it would be true to say ‘Experts 
think...’ when referring to a tiny minority of experts, but to do so would violate Grice’s Maxim of Quantity (i.e., 
give the most helpful amount of information). In this case it would be more informative to say ‘Some experts’ or 
‘A few experts’.  
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consensus vary between people and between phrases, and 3) to examine whether this variance is 
associated with the tendency to engage in cognitive reflection.  
Cognitive Reflection  
Put simply, cognitive reflection is the tendency to reflect on our intuitive ‘gut feelings’. Cognitive 
reflection is generally understood in the context of dual process models of human thinking (e.g., 
Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011). Dual process models are based on the premise that humans engage 
in two distinct types of thinking. The first (generally known as Type 1 or intuitive thinking) is fast, 
instinctive and heuristic driven (e.g., correctly verifying that 2+2=4). It is independent of cognitive 
ability, delivering fast but not always accurate judgements (i.e., it is particularly susceptible to 
cognitive biases). The second type (generally known as Type 2 or reflective thinking) is a slower, 
more resource demanding and conscious type of thinking that is related to individual differences in 
cognitive ability (e.g., correctly verifying that 17x8=136). 
Several prominent dual process accounts take a default-interventionist approach to explain how the 
two systems work together (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Such theories assume that intuitive Type 
1 processes act first, providing a fast and intuitive default response. Cognitively demanding Type 2 
processes then intervene to revise that output, if required.  
Often Type 1 processing suffices to make an accurate judgment or decision (e.g., correctly 
categorising an object as human or non-human, correctly verifying that 2+2=4, correctly recognising a 
friend etc.). Other times the output of type 1 intuitive thinking can fail to produce a normative 
response. The following problem is a classic example of how Type 1 processes can be misled: 
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost? (in cents) _________ 
For those seeing this question for the first time, the answer that quickly comes to mind is ‘10 cents’. 
This is the fast and intuitive output of default Type 1 processing. Some people are content to retain 
this default answer without further reflection. Other people have a tendency to reflect on and revise 
their gut feelings. In other words, they are more likely to allow Type 2 processes to intervene. Those 
who do allow this intervention soon realise that the default response (10 cents) is incorrect and revise 
their answer to ‘5 cents’. Those people who are more likely to spontaneously reflect on their intuitions 
are said to have higher levels of Cognitive Reflection (Frederick, 2005).  
Cognitive Reflection and scientific consensus  
We propose that generic news media headlines lure readers towards an intuitive Type 1 conclusion in 
a similar way to the bat and ball problem. Specifically, we propose that generic headlines encourage 
the ‘hasty generalisation’ that ‘Experts = All experts’. This is consistent with work demonstrating that 
people are susceptible to overgeneralising from generic statements; a phenomenon known as the 
‘Generic Overgeneralization Effect’ (Leslie, Khemlani & Glucksberg, 2011). If a generic statement is 
believed to be true (e.g., Ducks lay eggs) then some people erroneously overgeneralize that the 
equivalent universal statement is also true (e.g., All ducks lay eggs). Likewise, when participants have 
no knowledge about the truth of a generic (e.g., “Lorches have purple feathers”) some perceive it as 
referring to nearly all members of that category (i.e., nearly all Lorches have purple feathers) 
(Cimpian et al., 2010).  
In the context of generic news headlines (e.g., Experts believe…) a hasty (over)generalisation would 
be that the opinion of ‘experts’ is the opinion of all or nearly all experts. This would be consistent 
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with the work of Aklin and Urpelainen (2014) who concluded that in the absence of any dissenting 
information “...the general public's default assumption is a very high degree of scientific consensus”. 
However, a little reflection (Type 2 thinking) reveals this generalisation is not necessarily true. If an 
individual reflects, they may identify counterexamples to their intuition. For example, they might 
question the plausibility of their initial judgement (complete consensus on any topic is rare), they 
might question the semantics of the phrase (‘experts’ could actually refer to just a few experts) or they 
might question the source of the message (the news media often sensationalise and gloss over the 
details). The application of Type 2 reflective thinking may therefore lead to the hasty generalisation 
being revised downwards (e.g., from ‘most’ or ‘all’ experts to ‘some experts’).  
Our hypothesis is that people initially interpret generic phrases reporting scientific findings by making 
a hasty (over)generalisation (e.g., Experts think = All experts think). Those who reflect on this 
appealing inference are more likely to identify reasons (counterexamples) to revise the initial estimate 
of consensus downwards. Variation in estimates of consensus should therefore be negatively 
associated with variance in cognitive reflection (i.e., more reflective people perceive a lower degree of 
consensus).  
This hypothesis was tested by two pre-registered studies. The first examined whether an individual's 
degree of trait Cognitive Reflection (measured both objectively and subjectively) is associated with 
the degree of consensus they perceive when reading common news media phrases such as ‘Scientists 
believe…’ and ‘Experts say…’. We predicted that more reflective people would produce lower 
estimates of consensus, as they are more likely to override and revise their hasty 
(over)generalizations. The second Study then used time pressure and cognitive load to experimentally 
induce intuitive (Type 1) processing as participants rated the degree of consensus. We then 
encouraged them to actively reflect on their initial judgement with the option to revise it. By 
manipulating state reflection using this ‘two-response paradigm’ (Thompson, Prowse Turner & 
Pennycook, 2011) we aimed to determine whether there is a causal link between processing style and 
the revision of hasty (over)generalisations. We predicted that participants would produce relatively 
high estimates of scientific consensus (hasty generalisations) when engaged in fast Type 1 processing 
but would revise these downwards when encouraged to reflect on their initial gut feeling.  
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Study 1  
Method 
Participants were asked to estimate the degree of scientific consensus implied by common generic 
phrases such as “Scientists say…” and “Experts believe…”. We predicted that variance in these 
estimates would negatively correlate with variance in the ability to reflect on and override appealing 
but incorrect intuitions.  
We chose to approach this question in the most controlled way possible, by eliminating the influence 
of context and prior beliefs on the interpretation of our generic phrases. To do this we used 
decontextualized phrases (e.g., Scientists believe…) rather than fully contextualised phrases. 
Consensus ratings of a contextualised headline such as “Scientists believe climate change is due to 
human activity” are more likely to be based on an individual’s prior beliefs about consensus on 
climate change than on the phrase “Scientists believe”. By presenting the generic phrases in isolation, 
we can be sure that estimates of consensus relate to the specific generic phrase and not to prior beliefs 
about specific issues. The aim is to generate relatively ‘pure’ estimates of consensus implied by 
different generic phrases. We acknowledge that these consensus estimates will inevitably change with 
the addition of context (e.g., “Scientists believe climate change is due to human activity” is likely to 
imply greater scientific consensus than the decontextualized “Scientists believe…”. Likewise, we 
would expect that “Scientists believe the earth is flat” to implies less scientific consensus. Our goal is 
to examine the degree of consensus implied by generic phrases in isolation. Consensus estimates will 
inevitably vary between participants and we predict that this variability will be associated with 
variability in Cognitive Refection.  
The following protocol was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework prior to data collection 
https://osf.io/n7pj8/  
Design 
A cross-sectional design was used with the measures being: (i) an objective measure of cognitive 
reflection (CRT-7) (ii) a subjective measure of rational ability (REI Rational Ability subscale), (iii) a 
subjective measure of rational engagement (REI Rational Engagement subscale) (iv) scientific 
consensus estimates for nine decontextualized target phrases (e.g., “Scientists say…”, “Experts 
believe…”).  
Participants  
Because we planned to analyse the data using structural equation modelling, a power simulation was 
performed using the simsem package in R (code for this simulation can found on the Study OSF 
page). This indicated that a minimum sample of 200 participants would be required to achieve power 
of .8 (ɑ=.05, two-tailed). We pre-registered a target sample size of 350 to account for possible data 
exclusions and to achieve a level of power in excess of .8.  
Participants were recruited online via the www.prolific.co participant pool. This pool consists of over 
70,000 registered users. A recent comparison of participant pools showed that Prolific users are naiver 
and more diverse than MTurk users, while providing a comparable quality of data (Peer, Brandimarte, 
Samat & Acquisti, 2017). Pre-screening ensured that the Study was only advertised to those aged 18 
years or older and who spoke English as their first language. IP addresses were not collected as 
Prolific take a number of steps to avoid duplicate responses and automated responses by bots 
(Bradley, 2018).  
In total, 355 participants consented to take part. Pre-registered exclusion criteria dictated that 
participants would be excluded if they did not complete the survey (these were considered to have 
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withdrawn, as per our ethical approval conditions) or declared that they did not complete the survey 
seriously. Four participants did not complete the survey and were excluded. All remaining participants 
declared that they responded seriously, leaving a final sample of 351 participants aged 18-72 (Mage = 
35.03, SD = 11.33). Of these 113 identified as male, 237 identified as female and one selected ‘Other’. 
Participants were paid £1.30.  
Materials  
The survey was constructed using the Qualtrics online survey platform.  
Measures of thinking style  
Cognitive reflection was measured both objectively by the Cognitive Reflection Test and subjectively 
by the REI Rational Ability and Rational Engagement subscales. Higher scores on the CRT imply 
objectively greater ability reflect on and override Type 1 intuitions. Likewise, higher scores on the 
REI rationality subscale indicate a greater engagement with effortful, reflective thinking.  
Objective measure of Cognitive Reflection. The Cognitive Reflection Test was used as an objective 
measure of reflective thinking. The validity of the original three-item CRT (Frederick, 2005) has been 
threatened by the widespread publication of the test materials, such that individuals with prior 
exposure to materials score significantly higher than those with no prior exposure (Haigh, 2016; 
Steiger & Reips, 2016). This raw score increase does not affect the Test’s predictive ability (Bialek & 
Pennycook, 2018) but to minimise the impact of prior exposure we opted to use the longer CRT-7 
(Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2014) which contains additional, less familiar questions. Designed to 
assess the ability to engage in analytic thinking, it assesses the tendency to override an appealing but 
incorrect intuitive response and engage in further reflection leading to the correct response. The CRT-
7 comprises of seven mathematically worded problems (including the bat and ball problem) that cue 
an initial incorrect intuitive response that must be overridden to arrive at the correct conclusion. The 
overall CRT-7 score was calculated as the sum of all correct responses, with higher scores indicating a 
more reflective thinking style. The lowest possible score was 0 and the highest 7. In this Study the 
internal reliability measured using Cronbach's alpha was 0.77.  
Subjective measure of Cognitive Reflection. The Rational Ability and Rational Engagement 
subscales of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) were used as a 
measure of subjective preference for Type 2, reflective thinking. Participants were asked to read each 
statement and rate the extent that the statements referred or did not refer to them: e.g. “I have a logical 
mind” (1 = definitely not true of myself, 5 = definitely true of myself). The presentation order of items 
was randomised (see Keaton, 2017). Seventeen items were reverse scored and subscale scores were 
calculated as the mean of the relevant items. In this Study the internal reliability measured using 
Cronbach's alpha was 0.83 for the Rational Ability subscale and 0.86 for the Rational Engagement 
subscale.  
Scientific Consensus measure. Participants were presented with nine decontextualized generic 
phrases (e.g., “Scientists say…”, “Experts believe…”, “Researchers think…”) made up of a subject 
and a verb followed by ellipsis. See Table 1 for the list of phrases used.  
Table 1: Target phrases rated by participants in Study 1  
Scientists believe... Researchers believe... Experts believe... 
Scientists say... Researchers say... Experts say... 
Scientists think... Researchers think... Experts think... 
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Participants were asked to estimate how many relevant scientists [experts/researchers] they thought 
each phrase applied to on a sliding scale ranging from zero ‘no [scientists/experts/researchers] ’ to 
100 ‘all [scientists/experts/researchers]’.  
“Please estimate how many relevant [scientists/experts/researchers] you think this statement applies 
to. We are simply interested in your personal opinion. There is no right or wrong answer.” 
The scale was not numbered, however a number between 0-100 was visible to participants as they 
moved the slider.  
The subjects of our nine target phrases were “Scientists” [three items], “Experts” [three items] and 
“Researchers” [three items] followed by a base verb that implied some degree of consensus (e.g., 
‘believe’, ‘say’, ‘think’). The three subjects were chosen as a corpus search showed they are 
frequently used as general terms to describe the authors of scientific work. Other subjects considered 
after searching for synonyms of the three nouns above were Academics, Scholars, Doctors, Lecturers 
and Professors but a corpus search revealed that these were infrequently used to convey scientific 
consensus. More specific job titles such as ‘psychologists’, ‘neuroscientists’ or ‘physicists’ were 
considered beyond the scope of this investigation.  
The subjects were paired with verbs that implied some degree of scientific consensus. To select the 
verbs, we searched the British National Corpus using an online interface (https://www.english-
corpora.org/bnc/) to identify the 30 base verbs that most frequently collocate with “Scientists”, 
“Experts” and “Researchers”. From these lists we selected three base verbs that frequently 
accompanied each of our subjects. These were:  
1) ‘believe’ (ranked as the most frequent collocate of ‘Scientists’ and ‘Researchers’, ranked second 
most frequent collocate of ‘Experts)  
2) ‘say’ (ranked as the most frequent collocate of ‘Experts’ and second most frequent collocate of 
‘Scientists’ and ‘Researchers’) 
3) ‘think’ (ranked as the third most frequent collocate of ‘Scientists’ and ‘Researchers’ and the 
seventh most frequent collocate of ‘Experts’) 
The nine target items were presented amongst nine filler items, three of which referred to ‘Some 
[scientists/experts/researchers] …”, three to ‘Many [scientists/experts/researchers] ...’ and three to 
‘Few [scientists/experts/researchers] …’. This was to ensure that participants remained engaged and 
used the full range of the scale. These were paired with three verbs that frequently accompany the 
subjects (these were ‘suggest’, ‘agree’, ‘argue’). These different verbs were chosen to make the task 
less repetitive for participants. The filler phrases are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2: Filler phrases rated by participants in Study 1  
Some scientists argue… Some researchers suggest... Some experts agree... 
Many scientists suggest... Many researchers agree... Many experts argue... 
Few scientists agree... Few researchers argue... Few experts suggest... 
 
The internal reliability measured using Cronbach's alpha was 0.97.  
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Seriousness check. To exclude non-serious responses, participants were asked at the end of the Study 
whether they took part seriously. Seriousness checks have been suggested to substantially improve the 
quality of data collected (Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich & Musch, 2013). Participants were advised they 
would still be paid even if they did declare non-serious responding. Our pre-registered exclusion 
criteria dictated that non-serious participants would be excluded from the analysis.  
 
Procedure  
Ethical approval for all studies in this paper was granted through the faculty ethics committee of the 
authors’ institution. An information sheet at the start of the Qualtrics survey informed participants 
they would be asked about their understanding of some phrases commonly used by the media, be 
asked to solve some simple problems and to answer questions regarding their thinking style.  
Participants first saw the 18 phrases (9 target items plus 9 fillers) and provided consensus estimates 
for each. These were presented one per page in a different random order to each participant. They then 
completed the CRT-7, the REI (with statements presented in a different random order for each 
participant), and then the seriousness check. All items required a response. Participants could not 
progress beyond a page until all questions had been answered. Mean completion time was 13.15 
minutes (SD = 7.71).  
Results  
Pre-registered analysis  
The following analyses were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework prior to data collection 
https://osf.io/n7pj8/registrations. The raw data and R analysis script are publicly available via the OSF 
https://osf.io/n7pj8/ . There were no missing data as all questions required a response.  
The mean CRT-7 score was 2.65 correct answers (SD= 2.16). The mean REI rational ability and 
rational engagement subscale scores were 3.48 (SD= 0.62) and 3.44 (SD=0.67) respectively. The 
mean rating of consensus implied across our nine generic phrases was 53.82 (SD= 25.60) on a 0-100 
scale (see Figure 1 for mean ratings of each individual phrase).  
As we aimed to measure the extent to which estimates of consensus vary between people and between 
phrases, we calculated descriptive statistics averaged over our 351 participants (M=53.82, SD=25.60) 
and averaged over our nine items (M=53.82, SD=2.48) separately. The variability in means between 
participants was approximately ten times greater than the variability between items.  
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Figure 1: Mean degree of consensus implied by the phrases used in Study 1 (Averaged over 351 
participants, Error bars represent one standard deviation). Generic phrases in bold. The scale was 
anchored at 0 (no scientists/experts/researchers) and 100 (all scientists/experts/researchers).  
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Consistent with previous research, the CRT-7 was positively correlated with the REI Rational Ability 
(r(349) =.285 p<.001) and REI Rational Engagement (r(349) =.276 p<.001) subscales. Ratings of all 
nine generic consensus ratings were strongly and significantly correlated with each other (correlations 
ranged from r(349) = .74, p<.001 to r(349) = .86, p<.001).  
Following our pre-registered analysis plan we used Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to examine 
the direct path between a latent 'Cognitive Reflection' variable and a latent 'Scientific Consensus' 
variable (see Figure 2). We predicted there would be a significant negative relationship between these 
latent variables (i.e., more reflective people make lower estimates of consensus). The latent Cognitive 
Reflection variable was measured using CRT-7 total score, REI Rational Ability subscale and REI 
Rational Engagement subscale. The latent 'Scientific Consensus' variable was measured using 
consensus ratings to the nine generic phrases described above. The filler phrases qualified with 
‘some’, ‘many’ and ‘few’ were not part of the latent 'Scientific Consensus' variable.   
Analysis was conducted using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) in R version 3.6.0 (R Core Team, 
2019). Prior to conducting the analysis, scientific consensus ratings were transformed to z scores to 
reduce the difference in variance magnitude between these ratings and the other measures, this was 
unforeseen but required as our models did not converge. This transformation was not pre-registered 
but transformations such as these are commonly employed to achieve convergence and do not affect 
the fundamental results (Little, 2013:17)  
Model fit was assessed using 𝒳2, CFI, TLI and RMSEA. The model 𝒳2 was significant (𝒳2 (53) 
=141.848, p<.001), which is typical for large samples (Bollen, 1989; Lance & Vandenberg, 2001). 
CFI (0.979) and TLI (0.974) values were greater than 0.95 and RMSEA was 0.069 (90% CI: 0.055 - 
0.083) indicating an adequate model fit.  
Figure 2 shows that there was a negative relationship between the latent 'Cognitive Reflection' 
variable and a latent 'Scientific Consensus' variable, but this was weak and not statistically significant 
(𝛽 = -0.063, SE=0.075, p=.304).  
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Figure 2: Structural equation model of the relationship between Cognitive Reflection and estimates of 
Scientific Consensus implied by nine generic phrases. Cognitive Reflection and Scientific Consensus 
are latent variables (Standardised solution, N=351). The model 𝒳2 was significant (𝒳2 (53) =141.848, 
p<.001), CFI (0.979) and TLI (0.974) values were greater than 0.95 and RMSEA was 0.069 (90% CI: 
0.055 - 0.083). Figure labels: CRT-7 = Cognitive Reflection Test (7 item version), REI-RA = REI 
Rational Ability subscale, REI-RE = REI Rational Engagement subscale, SB= Scientists believe…, 
SS= Scientists say…, ST= Scientists think…, RB= Researchers believe…, RS= Researchers say…, 
RT= Researchers think…, EB= Experts believe…, ES= Experts say…, ET= Experts think... 
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Exploratory analysis 
In addition to the nine generic phrases used in Study 1, which were the focus of this Study, 
participants also saw nine ‘filler’ phrases which were included to make the task less repetitive. Three 
of these phrases were quantified with ‘some’, three with ‘many’ and three with ‘few’ (see Table 2). 
During the peer review process, it became apparent that our hypothesis that people overestimate 
consensus and then revise downwards on reflection, may also be relevant to the interpretation of 
verbal quantifiers more generally (i.e., phrases such as ‘many scientists…’ and ‘few scientists…’). To 
explore this possibility, we calculated bivariate correlations between each of our nine fillers and our 
three measures of cognitive reflection (see Table 3). Interpretations of the ‘many’ fillers were largely 
unrelated to our cognitive reflection measures. Interpretations of the three ‘Few’ statements had weak 
negative relationships with our three measures of cognitive reflection. There was also some evidence 
of a similar pattern with our ‘some’ statements.   
 
Table 3: Exploratory bivariate correlations (Pearson’s r) between each of our filler phrases and our 
three measures of cognitive reflection.  
 
CRT-7 Rational 
Ability 
Rational 
Engagement 
Some scientists argue… -0.12* -0.06 -0.06 
Some researchers suggest...   -0.1† -0.04 -0.09 
Some experts agree… -0.13* -0.1† -0.12* 
Many scientists suggest...     -0.03 -0.03 -0.12* 
Many researchers agree...     0.04 -0.02 -0.07 
Many experts argue… 0.0001 -0.03 -0.05 
Few scientists agree... -0.21** -0.16** -0.15** 
Few researchers argue...      -0.16** -0.13* -0.11* 
Few experts suggest... -0.14** -0.15** -0.1† 
Note: †p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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Discussion  
The first aim of this paper was to reveal the degree of scientific consensus implied by commonly used 
generic phrases such as “Scientists say…”, “Experts think…” and “Researchers believe”. Study 1 
shows that such decontextualized phrases imply a slim majority of scientists (Mean estimate of 
consensus was 53.8% of relevant scientists/experts/researchers). This mean consensus estimate was 
greater the mean estimates for filler phrases quantified with ‘Few’ (17.7%) or ‘Some’ (32.1%) and 
lower than fillers quantified with ‘Many’ (59.3%) (see Figure 1).  
The second aim was to reveal the extent to which estimates of consensus vary between people and 
between phrases. Mean estimates varied very little between our nine commonly used phrases 
(SD=2.5) but varied widely between our 351 participants (SD=25.6). On average, the nine phrases we 
selected each implied a similar level of consensus (ranging from 50.1% to 56.9%) suggesting that 
generics imply a similar degree of consensus, regardless of the subject or verb used (e.g., ‘Researchers 
say...’ tends to be interpreted in much the same way as ‘Scientists think...’). In contrast, our 
participants behaved very differently from each other, with some estimating that, on average, the nine 
statements referred to as few as 2% of relevant scientists and others estimating that they refer to 100% 
of relevant scientists. Both extremes are plausible interpretations of a generic.  
The third aim was to examine whether this variance in estimates between participants is associated 
with variance in cognitive reflection. We predicted that a latent Cognitive Reflection variable (in 
which cognitive reflection was measured both objectively and subjectively) would be negatively 
associated with estimates of consensus implied by generic phrases (e.g., Experts think…). This 
prediction was based on the hypothesis that generic phrases encourage people to make an intuitive 
overgeneralization (e.g., Experts think = All experts think) that is then revised downwards by those 
who spontaneously engage in cognitive reflection. A weak negative relationship was observed 
between cognitive reflection and estimates of consensus, but this was not statistically significant. 
Therefore, the data from this highly powered Study do not support our hypothesis.  
Exploratory analysis was also conducted on the filler items (i.e., phrases quantified with ‘some’, 
‘many’ and ‘few’) which was not pre-registered. This allowed us to explore whether hypothesis that 
people overestimate consensus and then revise downwards on reflection may be relevant to the 
interpretation of verbal quantifiers more generally (i.e., phrases such as ‘many scientists…’ and ‘few 
scientists…’). This analysis revealed weak negative relationships between filler phrases quantified 
with ‘few’ (e.g., Few scientists agree...) and our measures of cognitive reflection. A similar but less 
consistent pattern was observed for fillers quantified with ‘some’. This suggests that those who are 
more reflective tend to give lower consensus estimates to phrases quantified with ‘few’ and ‘some’, 
consistent with the idea that people initially overestimate consensus and revise their estimate 
downwards on reflection.  Future confirmatory research is required to confirm this negative 
relationship between the interpretation of verbal quantity phrases (such as ‘few’ and ‘some’) and 
cognitive reflection.  
One explanation for the null findings in Study 1 is that estimates of scientific consensus implied by 
generic phrases are unrelated to trait cognitive reflection. However, before accepting this conclusion, 
an alternative possibility should be explored. This possibility is that the Study protocol actively 
encouraged participants to engage in analytical thought, making estimates of consensus insensitive to 
trait variance in cognitive reflection. Explicitly asking participants to assign a quantity to the nine 
phrases may have encouraged them to reflect on their meaning in a much deeper way than they 
typically would (i.e., engaging Type 2 thinking). Therefore, all participants may have revised their 
initial estimates before giving a final response, rather than just those who more readily engage in 
reflective thinking.  
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In Study 2 we sought to overcome this limitation and determine whether there is a cause and effect 
relationship between processing style and estimates of consensus. To do this, we used a two-response 
paradigm (Thompson et al., 2011) that was designed to force an intuitive estimate (response 1), before 
giving participants the opportunity to reflect on and revise that estimate (response 2). If estimates of 
consensus are related to thinking style, then this direct experimental manipulation will result in 
relatively higher estimates of consensuses when the initial intuitive estimate is given (due to 
participants over generalising) and relatively lower estimates when they are encouraged to reflect on 
their intuition.  
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Study 2 
Method 
In this second online Study, participants were asked to estimate the degree of scientific consensus 
implied by common generic phrases such as “Scientists say…” at two time points. At Time 1 (T1) 
participants made an intuitive consensus judgement under cognitive load and time pressure to 
encourage Type 1 processing by suppressing Type 2 processing. At Time 2 (T2) the cognitive load 
was removed, and participants were given unlimited time to consider their first response with the 
option to revise their estimate, if desired. We predicted that intuitive consensus estimates at T1 would 
be relatively high and would be revised downwards on reflection at T2. This is an adaption of the two-
response paradigm developed by Thompson et al. (2011).  
The following protocol was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework prior to data collection 
https://osf.io/2vh9w/  
Design 
A repeated measures experimental design was used with the response time point (T1 and T2) being 
the repeated measures independent variable and the degree of scientific consensus participants 
assigned to the target phrase the dependent variable. 
Participants 
Power analysis was conducted assuming one fixed factor (which is repeated measures with two 
levels) and two random factors (participants and items). Power analysis was conducted using the two 
random factor Power calculator developed by Westfall, Kenny & Judd (2014). With an anticipated 
effect size of d=0.5, we found that the most efficient and practical design to achieve power of 0.8 
would require a minimum of 16 target items and 118 participants.  
As per Study 1, participants were recruited online via the www.prolific.co participant pool. Pre-
screening ensured that the Study was only advertised to those aged 18 years or older, who spoke 
English as their first language and who did not take part in either Study 1 or the pre-test for Study 2.  
In total, 194 participants consented to take part. Participants were excluded if they did not complete 
the survey (N = 12). All participants declared that they completed the survey seriously. This left a 
final sample of 182 participants aged 18-73 (Mage = 36.92, SD = 11.68). Of these, 93 identified as 
male, 88 identified as female and one selected ‘Other’. Participants were paid £1.50.  
Materials  
A detailed description of the Study 2 materials can be found in Appendix 1.  
The survey was created using the Qualtrics online platform. All nine of the generic decontextualized 
phrases from Study 1 were used along with an additional seven generic phrases (16 target items in 
total). Four of the additional phrases used “Academics” as the subject; it being the fourth most 
frequently used subject to describe authors of scientific work. This was paired with the same base 
verbs as Study 1 (“Academics Believe…”, “Academics Say…”, “Academics Think…”). An 
additional base verb “agree” was then selected as a corpus search revealed it to be the fourth most 
popular verb that frequently collocated with our four subjects and implied some degree of scientific 
consensus (ranked as the third most frequent collocate for “Researchers” and “Academics”, ranked 
seventh most frequent collocate of Researchers, and ranked 29th most frequent collocate of 
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“Scientists”). “Agree” was paired with the four subjects to create the additional decontextualized 
phrases: “Scientists Agree…”, “Experts Agree…”, “Researchers Agree…”, “Academics Agree…”.  
Using the same slider layout as Study 1, participants were asked to estimate how many relevant 
experts they thought each phrase applied to on a sliding scale ranging from zero ‘No 
scientists/experts/researchers/academics’ to 100 ‘All scientists/experts/researchers/academics’.  
The 16 target items were presented amongst four filler items which used the same subject and base 
verbs as the targets but were prefaced with quantifiers (“Some Scientist Believe...”, “Most Experts 
Say...”, “Many Researchers Think...”, “Few Academics Agree”). These were simply to make the task 
less repetitive for participants.  
Prior to starting the experimental task participants completed four practice items to accustom them to 
making intuitive judgements under time pressure. These were also structured using the same subject 
and base verbs as the target items but with a quantifier prefacing them (worded differently to the filler 
items) to accustom subjects to using the slider. Given the time pressure element, a pre-screening 
requirement was that participants could only complete the Study on a desktop computer with a click-
based mouse (i.e. not a touchpad). 
Procedure  
In this experiment the rating of scientific consensus was given twice for each phrase. The two-
response format was similar to that introduced by Thompson et al., (2011) which was developed to 
gain insight into the time-course of intuitive and deliberate responses. Participants provided two 
estimates for each generic phrase. For the first response, participants were asked to give the very first 
estimate that came to mind (i.e. an intuitive estimate). To ensure that participants gave an intuitive 
response they gave their initial estimate under time pressure and under cognitive load (this application 
and time pressure and cognitive load in an online Study has been previously been used by Bago & De 
Neys, 2019a, 2019b; Raoelison & De Neys. 2019). Cognitive load was applied by asking participants 
to memorise a pattern of four crosses presented in a 3x3 matrix for later recall (see Appendix 1 for 
details).  
Time pressure was applied by instructing participants to select a point on the sliding scale within three 
seconds (this time limit was determined by a reading time pre-test conducted with 41 participants, see 
Appendix 2 for details of the pretest). This initial fast response is thought to reflect the output of 
System 1 processes based on evidence that that rapid responses rely more on automatic heuristic 
processing and therefore likely reflect System 1 output (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Pennycook, De 
Neys, Evans, Stanovich & Thompson, 2018).  
Following the initial intuitive response, participants were asked to identify the pattern they saw from 
four options (thus removing the cognitive load). Feedback was immediately given to indicate whether 
the answer was correct or incorrect. The generic phrase was then presented again. Participants were 
reminded of their initial intuitive estimate (e.g., “Your intuitive estimate under time pressure was 85 
on a scale of 0-100”) and shown a slider that was automatically set to this initial estimate. They were 
instructed that they could take as long as they liked to reflect on their initial estimate and had the 
option to revise their answer (if desired) by moving the slider. If participants did not wish to revise 
their intuitive response, they were advised to press the ‘continue’ button to start the next trial. This 
second response (T2) is thought to reflect the output of System 2 processes which are believed to be 
intentional, conscious and time consuming (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Pennycook et al., 2018).  
Prior to completing the experimental task, participants completed a practice phase (described in detail 
in Appendix 1) where the memory and ratings tasks were introduced in stages to build familiarity. 
After the practice phase, each participant saw the target and filler phrases presented in a randomised 
order and completed the two-response protocol for each phrase (see Appendix 1 for detailed 
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procedure). All phrases at T1 required a response and participants could not progress until a response 
was given. Mean completion time was 14.10 minutes (SD = 7.70).  
Results  
The following analyses were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework prior to data collection 
https://osf.io/2vh9w/registrations. The raw data and analysis script are publicly available via the OSF 
https://osf.io/2vh9w/.  
There were no missing data as all T1 questions required a response. Descriptive statistics suggest that 
participants engaged with the task as instructed. First, the average participant correctly recalled 92.2% 
of the matrices (SD=7.8) suggesting that cognitive load was successfully applied at T1 (in other 
words, participants engaged with the instruction to memorise each matrix). Second, participants 
revised their intuitive (T1) rating at T2 on 47.8% of trials, suggesting that they frequently revised their 
initial (T1) estimate, rather than simply retaining it.  
Following our pre-registered protocol, we excluded 146 T1 estimates where a response was not given 
within 3.25 seconds. These excluded observations represented 5% of the T1 data. Excluded values 
were replaced using mean imputation. Figure 3 shows that the mean T1 estimate was 60.74 (SD= 
20.15) and the mean T2 estimate was 61.82 (SD=21.96).  
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Figure 3: Mean estimate of consensus at T1 and T2 (N=182). The mean is represented by a horizontal 
line. The band represents 95% Bayesian Highest Density Interval.   
 
 
 
 
A linear mixed effects model was fitted using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker & Walker, 
2015) in R version 3.6.0 (R Core Team, 2019). The fixed factor was Time (T1 vs T2). Participants 
and Items were treated as random factors. We began with a maximal random effects structure (Barr, 
Levy, Scheepers & Tily, 2013) with random slopes and intercepts for Participants and Items. This 
resulted in a singular fit. We therefore systematically removed random effects until we achieved a 
non-singular fit. We first removed random slopes by items. This reduced model also resulted in a 
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singular fit. We further reduced the model by removing random slopes by participants. This 
‘intercepts only’ model achieved a non-singular fit.  
The final non-singular model included random intercepts for both Participants and Items. We 
compared this intercepts-only model to a null model (without the fixed effect) using a likelihood ratio 
test. There was a significant difference between the likelihood of these two models (χ2 (5) =10.533, 
p=.00116). This indicates that the fixed effect of Time affected perceived scientific consensus, with 
T2 estimates of consensus an average of 1.07 points (SE=0.33) greater than T1 estimates (on our 101 
point scale). This effect was in the opposite direction to our pre-registered prediction. A standardised 
effect size (d) was calculated by dividing the mean difference between conditions by the square root 
of the pooled variance components (Westfall, Kenny & Judd, 2014). The size of this effect was small 
(d=0.043).  
 
Discussion  
In Study 2, participants estimated the degree of consensus implied by 16 generic phrases (e.g., 
Scientists say…) on a 0-100 scale that ranged from ‘No scientists’ to ‘All scientists’. They did this on 
two occasions. The first (T1) was under time pressure and under cognitive load. The second (T2) was 
an opportunity to revise the initial estimate without any time pressure or cognitive load. We predicted 
that participants would provide relatively high estimates of consensus at T1, with fast and intuitive 
System 1 processing leading to a hasty overgeneralization. At T2 we predicted that this initial 
estimate would be revised downwards by more deliberative System 2 processing. We found the 
opposite effect. The average consensus estimate at T1 was 60.74 and at T2 the average estimate was 
revised upwards to 61.82. The size of this upwards revision was small (d= 0.043).  
These data do not support our hypothesis that participants would revise their intuitive T1 estimates of 
consensus downwards at T2. The most common behaviour was for participants was to make no 
revision to their intuitive estimate (T1 and T2 estimates were identical on 52.2% of trials). When a 
revision was made, this was most frequently an upwards revision (T2 estimates were higher than T1 
on 30.8% of trials). Revisions were only made in the predicted (downwards) direction on 17% of 
trials.  
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General Discussion  
Generic news headlines (e.g., “Scientists believe the secret of a good night’s sleep is all in our 
genes”) are inherently ambiguous. They require the reader or listener to infer the degree of consensus 
among ‘Scientists’. Do most scientists believe there is an important link between sleep and genes or 
just a select few? Those who do not read beyond the headline must rely on a subjective inference. 
These inferences can be consequential, as perceived scientific consensus on a given issue is an 
important factor in determining our own beliefs on that issue (e.g., van der Linden et al., 2015). In this 
paper we set out to 1) reveal the degree of scientific consensus implied by commonly used generic 
phrases such as “Scientists say…”, “Experts think…” and “Researchers believe…” 2) to reveal the 
extent to which estimates of consensus vary between people and between phrases , and 3) to examine 
whether this variance is associated with a reflective thinking style. We did this by running two highly 
powered, pre-registered studies.  
In terms of the first aim, we revealed that commonly used generic phrases such as “Scientists say…”, 
“Experts think…” and “Researchers believe…” imply consensus among over half of all relevant 
experts (53.8% in Study 1, 60.74% in Study 2 T1 and 61.82% in Study 2 T2) . These ratings were 
based on decontextualized phrases and are therefore labile; prone to change with the addition of 
context. These baseline estimates are nonetheless important, as they show that in the absence of any 
other context generic phrases about experts imply consensus among a majority of experts. This 
starting point may be revised upwards or downwards with additional context but in cases where the 
context is new or unfamiliar to the reader (e.g., Scientists think it rains diamonds on Neptune) the 
generic consensus statement (e.g., Scientists think…) may be all a they have to go on.  
While in some cases it may be true that a generic such as ‘scientists believe…’ refers to a majority of 
scientists, much of the novel research hitting the headlines is the work of just one group of authors. 
Using the generic ‘scientists’ or ‘experts’ risks implying that the opinion of a small subset of experts 
is the opinion of the majority of experts. This risks being misleading and confusing to the public. For 
example, when research by one group of authors is attributed generically to experts (e.g., Scientists 
believe one glass of wine per day is beneficial) it may imply that this is the opinion of a majority of 
experts; when contradictory findings by a different group of authors are reported (e.g., Scientists 
believe one glass of wine per day is harmful) it implies that the majority of experts have changed their 
minds. When this happens several times, there is a risk that it will damage trust in science and expert 
advice (e.g., Scientists say one thing one day and another the next!) (see Koehler & Pennycook, 2019 
for related work). For these reasons, responsible reporting should avoid implying consensus through 
generic statements and instead use more specific quantity terms (e.g., A group of scientists…; ‘Some 
scientists…’).  
In terms of our second aim, the data revealed that mean estimates varied little between phrases (Study 
1 SD=2.5) but varied widely between participants (Study 1 SD=25.6). In other words, estimates of 
consensus were very similar for all of our generic phrases (mean estimates of consensus ranged from 
50.1 to 56.9). Generics, therefore, appear to imply the same degree of consensus regardless of whether 
the subject is ‘scientists’, ‘experts’ or ‘researchers’ or whether they ‘believe’, ‘think’ or ‘say’. In 
contrast, participants varied widely in their mean estimates of our generics (mean estimates of 
consensus ranged from 2% to 100%). The variance between participants was approximately ten times 
greater than between items. People thus draw very different inferences about the degree of consensus 
implied by generics, with some inferring they refer to very few experts and others to all experts. 
Those who make the strong inference that that ‘scientists’ refers to all or nearly all scientists are 
particularly at risk of changing their beliefs and behaviours based on the opinion of what could be a 
small minority of experts and of perceiving major scientific U-turns when different groups of experts 
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report contradictory findings. In contrast, those at the lower end of the spectrum may be less inclined 
to change their beliefs or behaviours even when there is widespread consensus.  
The wide variability between participants in Study 1 may in part be an artefact of our decision to use 
decontextualized phrases. The variability in consensus estimates of “scientists believe…” is inevitably 
going to greater than the variability corresponding to the same phrase used in context. What this does 
show is that in the absence of any other context, different people have different starting points for 
interpreting generics. The purpose of this Study was to examine whether variation in this 
decontextualized baseline estimate was related to variance in cognitive reflection. We tested the novel 
prediction that decontextualized generic phrases such as “Scientists believe…” encourage an intuitive 
overgeneralization about the degree of scientific consensus (e.g., Scientists believe = All scientists 
believe) that is then revised downwards to varying extents, on reflection (e.g., Scientists believe = 
Some scientists believe).  
In Study 1 we found no evidence to suggest that trait cognitive reflection is associated with estimates 
of scientific consensus. Likewise, in Study 2, we found no evidence that enforced reflection causes 
people to revise their intuitive estimates downwards. This suggests that the interpretation of a generic 
does not involve a process of intuitive overgeneralization and reflective belief revision. This leaves us 
without a satisfactory explanation for why estimates of consensus vary. Possible avenues for future 
research may be to explore the roles of experiential factors such as engagement with science, 
knowledge of the scientific process, level of education or cognitive factors such critical thinking, 
intelligence and need for cognition. Research should also focus on the implication of this variation in 
perceived consensus to determine the effects it has on subjective beliefs and behaviours.  
Generic attributions to ‘scientists’, ‘researchers’ and ‘experts’ are common in the media and social 
media, but they are inherently ambiguous. When generic attributions are presented out of context 
estimates of consensus vary widely, but on average they imply that a majority of the category (e.g., 
researchers, scientists, experts) are in agreement. For this reason, those reporting scientific research 
should avoid using generics when there is not a majority consensus among relevant experts and 
consumers of news should be aware that generics can intentionally or unintentionally misrepresent the 
true degree of consensus.  
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